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The Public Trust and Water Rights:

National Audubon Society v.
Superior Court
Roderick E. Walston*
The public trust doctrine provides for sovereign state interests
in navigable waters. In National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court, the CaliforniaSupreme Court held that the public trust doctrine, as applied in the water rights context, allows the state to
reconsiderpast waterallocationdecisions, and requiresa balancing of competingpublic andprivate needs in water. The decision
properly recognizes that historic water uses may not be consistent with modern public needs. The decision, however, overlooks
the naturalcongruency between public trust principles and water
law principlesfor the water law has traditionally recognized that
the state has a continuingsovereign interestin water. Courts and
agencies should apply these principles in a way that protects important public uses in water without causing undue dislocation
of existing water rights.
In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court,' the California
Supreme Court held that the public trust doctrine, which provides for
sovereign state control of navigable waters, applies to water rights granted
under state law. Applying the doctrine, the court held that the State of
California may determine whether the City of Los Angeles has the right
to continue diverting water from Mono Lake, a right that the city had
acquired many years earlier by a permit issued under California's water
law. Thus, NationalAudubon Society held that the state may reconsider
© Copyright 1987, University of Wyoming. See copyright notice at the beginning of
this issue.
* The author is a Senior Deputy Attorney General for the State of California. He
represented California in NationalAudubon Society. The views expressed are the author's
own and should not be attributed to the State of California or any of its agents.
1. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983).
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past water allocation decisions, even where the rights were granted long
ago and have been long exercised. The decision has gained prominence,
in part, as national attention has focused on Mono Lake as a resource!
Apart from its view of the resource, the decision raises significant, often
difficult questions concerning the nature of public and private interests
in water. Because of its potential impact on private water rights, it has
generated considerable controversy.'
This article will briefly examine the nature of state and private interests in water addressed in National Audubon Society. The decision,
it is submitted, properly holds that the states may reconsider past water
allocation decisions. The decision, however, suffers from certain doctrinal
infirmities in describing the relationship between public trust principles
and water laws. The decision viewed these principles as distinct, potentially conflicting concepts that must be reconciled; indeed, the court
regarded them as on a "collision course. ' ' 4 To the contrary, public trust
principles, although not explicitly, are a traditional feature of the water
law. Historically, water rights have been regarded as subject to state
regulation and control, and these rights have never been considered
beyond public scrutiny. Therefore, the public trust doctrine and water law
have a natural congruency that is often overlooked, and that was overlooked in National Audubon Society.
NATURE OF THE PUBLIc TRUST DOCTRINE

The public trust doctrine is a developing principle of American
jurisprudence, not yet fully articulated, that provides for sovereign state
control of navigable waters and their underlying beds. No clear consensus has emerged concerning the exact nature and effect of the doctrine.
It is a common law doctrine; it results from judicial innovation rather than
legislative enactment. Also, it is a state common law doctrine; it has been
developed by state courts to define the nature of public and private interests in water. The doctrine means, simply, what each state court says
that it means. To date, no clear jurisprudential view has emerged as to
its exact meaning.
2. See Young, The Troubled Waters of Mono Lake, 160 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 504-25
(Oct. 1981); Chasan, Mono Lake vs. Los Angeles: A Tug-of-War for Precious Water, 11

42-51 (Feb. 1981).
3. The NationalAudubon Society decision has received much comment, both favorable

SMITHSONIAN

and critical. See Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631 (1986); Dunning,
The Public Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law: Discord or Harmony? 30 RocKY MTN.

MIN. L. INST. 17-1(1984); Note, The Fifth Amendment Asa Limitation On ThePublic Trust
Doctrine In Water Law, 15 PAC. L.J. 1291 (1984); Note, National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court: The Expanding Public Trust Doctrine, 14 ENVTL. L. REV. 617 (1984); Note, Protecting the People's Waters: The CaliforniaSupreme CourtRecognizes Two Remedies to Safeguard
Public Trust Interests In Water, 59 WASH. L. REV. (1984); Note, The Public Trust Doctrine

Expansion and Integration:A Proposed BalancingTest, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 211 (1983);
Jawetz, The Public Trust Totem in PublicLand Law: Ineffective-And Undesirable-Judicial
Intervention, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 455 (1982).
4. NationalAudubonSociety, 33 Cal. 3d at 425, 658 P.2d at 712, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
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The most common definition of the public trust doctrine is that the
state holds its navigable waters and underlying beds in trust for the public 5 This trust responsibility authorizes, or perhaps requires, the state
to protect certain public uses in water. These uses are generally defined
as navigation, commerce, and fisheries., Some modern cases have held that
the doctrine includes myriad public uses, such as recreation, boating, and
esthetics. 7 The theory of the doctrine, according to the Supreme Court's
seminal decision in Illinois CentralRailroadCompany v. Illinois, is that
the state cannot alienate the public interest in water, or at least has the
right to revoke any property grants that create an alienation. It is unclear
whether the doctrine restrainsstate power, as in the first instance, or instead augments state power, as in the second. In either event, the doctrine holds that a private party cannot acquire a "vested" property right
in navigable waters or underlying beds that is superior to the state's power
to protect public uses in water?

DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

The public trust doctrine, it is often said, traces its origins to Roman
law. The Emperor Justinian, codifying Roman law in his Institutes, declared that water, like air, is incapable of private ownership; it belongs
10
to everyone and therefore can be owned by no one. This principle was
law. In England, the
common
English
carried forth and expanded in the
Crown was recognized as having a sovereign interest in navigable waters
that was paramount to the rights of private riparian landowners." After
the American Revolution, the Crown's sovereign interest in navigable
2
waters was transferred to the original thirteen states. Although the
states surrendered to the federal government the power to regulate commerce in the navigable waters, the states otherwise retained their sovereign interests in the water. Under the equal footing doctrine, new states
are admitted to statehood on an equal footing with other states, and thus
acquire the same sovereign interest in navigable waters as that enjoyed
5. See e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452-61 (1892); California
v. Superior Ct. of Lake County, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 218-21, 625 P.2d 229, 243-45, 172 Cal. Rptr.
696, 700-02 (1981); City of Berkeley v. Superior Ct. of Alameda County, 26 Cal. 3d 515,521-25,
606 P.2d 362, 364-68, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 329-33 (1980); Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251,
258-62, 491 P.2d 374, 378-81, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 794-98 (1971).
6. E.g., Illinois Centra; 146 U.S. at 452-61; City of Berkeley, 26 Cal. 3d at 521, 606
P.2d at 364-65, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
7. E.g., Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259, 491 P.2d 374, 379, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790,
795 (1971); Bohn v. Anderson, 107 Cal. App. 2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (1951); Munninghoff v.
Wisconsin Conservation Comm'n, 255 Wis. 252, 38 N.W.2d 712 (1949).
8. 146 U.S. at 387, 453 (1982).
9. NationalAudubon Society, 33 Cal. 3d at 445, 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at
363-69.
10. INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 2.1.1 (S. Scott trans. reprinted ed. 1973).
11. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11-18 (1894); Martin v. Wadeil, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367,
410 (1842).
12. Shively, 152 U.S. at 25-31; Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 259-62 (1891);
Wadell 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 410.
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by the original thirteen states.'" The federal government holds navigable
waters in trust for the future state during the territorial period. It then
discharges its trust responsibility by transferring its sovereignty to a newly created state.14
This historic principle, that the states retained or acquired sovereign
interests in navigable waters, explains the relationship of federal and state
power in our federal system in the area of water law. According to this
relationship, the states have a paramount sovereign interest in waterindeed, the water "belongs" to the state in a kind of proprietary sensebut the federal government retains a sovereign power to regulate commerce and navigation in the waters. This principle does not, however,
define the relationship of state power and private rights in water. The
U.S. Supreme Court has held that, although a new state may acquire
sovereign "ownership" of water under equal footing principles, it may surrender its "ownership" interest by allowing private landowners to acquire
fee interests in lands underlying water.' 5 Therefore, the relationship of
state power and private rights must be determined by state law, of which
the public trust doctrine is part.
The public trust doctrine, in its modern form, received its impetus in
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 6 decided in 1892. There, the Illinois legislature granted a fee interest in the Chicago waterfront to a private railroad company. The legislature later revoked the grant, and the railroad company sued to regain its
fee interest. The case originated in the Illinois courts, was removed to the
federal courts, and eventually reached the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Field, upheld the action of the Illinois legislature. The Court ruled that Illinois acquired sovereign title to lands
underlying navigable waters and that the lands were held in trust for certain public uses, specifically navigation, commerce, and fisheries.
Therefore, it was held, the Illinois legislature could not alienate its trust
responsibility to protect such uses, and if the legislature did in fact alienate
its responsibility by granting a fee interest, it could revoke the fee grant.
Illinois Centralraised many questions that were left unanswered. The
decision did not make clear whether the original fee grant was invalid,
or instead whether the legislature simply had the right to revoke it. The
Court stated only that the grant, "if not absolutely void on its face....
[is] subject to revocation."" Thus, the decision does not make clear whether
the public trust doctrine limits state power by precluding the creation
of private rights that impair public uses, or instead expands state power
by allowing the state to revoke such private rights.
13. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1977); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707,
716-17 (1950); Shively, 152 U.S. at 29-50; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1891);
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229 (1848).
14. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 373 (1977).
15. Hardin, 140 U.S. at 382-83; Shively, 152 U.S. at 29-50.
16. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
17. Id. at 453.
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Additionally, Illinois Centraldoes not make clear whether the state's
public trust power is an inherent power reserved by all states in our federal
system, or instead is a power reserved by Illinois under Illinois law. If
the former, the doctrine is apparently a federal common law doctrine, for
it defines the inherent nature of state power in our federal system; if the
latter, the doctrine is a state common law doctrine. If the doctrine is based
on federal law, the state presumably cannot surrender its public trust
authority, much like a state cannot fail to provide a republican form of
government.18 If, instead, the doctrine is based on state common law, the
state might be able to surrender its public trust authority through changing judicial interpretation of common law principles.
The analysis in Illinois Centralseemed to suggest that the public trust
doctrine is a federal common law doctrine that applies to all states. The
Court stated that "[t]he State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils
under them .... than it can abdicate its police powers in the administra0
tion of government and the preservation of the peace."" Thus, the Court
suggested that the state's public trust power stands on the same footing
as its police power, and the state police power would seem to be an inherent governmental power that cannot be relinquished in our federal
system. Indeed, the Court did not cite any decisions of the Illinois state
courts. Instead, it cited only its own decisions holding that the states acquire sovereign power over navigable waters under the equal footing doctrine.20 The citation of these decisions implies that the state's public trust
power is coterminous with its sovereign power under equal footing principles, which is based on federal law. If this is so, the states necessarily
retain whatever powers they acquired under equal footing principles, and
the outer limits of state public trust power are measured by the limits
of state power under the equal footing doctrine.
Later, however, in Appleby v. City of New York, 2,the Supreme Court
stated that Illinois Central was based on Illinois law, not federal law.
Under Appleby, although the outer limits of state power are determined
under equal footing principles, the inner public trust limits are defined
by each state's common law. Today, the public trust doctrine is generally
regarded as a state law doctrine, in that each state is free to define its
own sovereign interests in water. The doctrine effectively defines private
property rights, and each state is free to determine its own rules of property in our federal system. 2 If, however, a state purported to relinquish
all public interests in water to the point that the state could no longer
protect important commercial or navigation interests, as in Illinois Centra4 it is possible that the relinquishment would be held to be inconsistent with the inherent attributes of governmental power and hence invalid.
18. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; Pacific States Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Kiernan v. Portland, 223 U.S. 151 (1912).
19. Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. at 453.
20. Id at 456-59.
21. 271 U.S. 364 (1926).
22. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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The Court in Illinois Central under the circumstances of the case,
might have reached the same result by applying the state police power
rather than the public trust doctrine. Illinois' control of the Chicago waterfront was vital to the people of Illinois because it provided the major access to Lake Michigan, a major commercial link between Illinois and the
outside world. Therefore, the Court might have held that Illinois had the
right to revoke the fee grant or at least regulate the fee interest under
its police power. Illinois Central4 however, was decided in 1892, before the
broad reach of the state police power was fully understood. The states'
power to apply zoning restrictions against private property, for example,
was not recognized until 1926, many years after Illinois Centralwas decid23
ed.
More importantly, the police power authorizes state regulation of property rights but does not define the nature of the property right itself. In
Illinois Central, on the other hand, the Court, perhaps recognizing the
magnitude of state interests involved, held that the railroad company had
no property rights at all, not that its rights were subject to regulation
on a case-by-case basis. Illinois Central thus recognizes that the public
has a unique interest in water, and that the public interest in water transcends, or at least is different than, the public interest in land or other
activities within the scope of the police power. Illinois Central takes American water law beyond the limits of the police power to Justinian's maxim that water is a unique resource that belongs to all.
After Illinois Central, the California courts applied the public trust
doctrine in determining whether, as in Illinois Central the state can convey fee interests in lands underlying navigable waters.2 ' The California
courts held that the state has the right to convey fee interests, but that
such fee interests are burdened by a public trust "easement." To soften
the impact on private property rights, the California Supreme Court in
City of Berkeley v. SuperiorCourt,22 although holding that the public trust
doctrine invalidated fee interests granted under earlier legislative authority, held that its decision was not applicable to fee interests that had been
thoroughly developed in reliance on the earlier authority. 6 More importantly, prior to National Audubon Society the public trust doctrine was
23. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 305 (1926).
24. See, e.g., California v. Superior Ct. (Fogerty, 29 Cal. 3d 240, 625 P.2d 256,172 Cal.
Rptr. 713 (1981); California v. Superior Court of Lake County, 29 Cal. 3d 210, 625 P.2d 239,
172 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1981); City of Berkeley v. Superior Ct., 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362,
162 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1980); Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790
(1971); City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970).
25. 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1980.
26. The court in City of Berkeley stated that:
[Tihe appropriate resolution is to balance the interests of the public in tidelands
conveyed pursuant to the 1870 act against those of the landowners who hold
property under these conveyances. In the harmonizing of these claims, the principle we apply is that the interests of the public are paramount in property
that is still physically adaptable for trust uses, whereas the interests of the
grantees and their successors should prevail insofar as the tidelands have been
rendered substantially valueless for those purposes.
6 Cal. 3d at 534, 606 P.2d at 373, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
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generally applied in California, as in City of Berkeley, only to hold that
the state has sovereign ownership of lands underlying navigable waters.
The doctrine was not applied to determine whether the state has the right
to regulate the use of water itself, much less to determine the validity
of water rights granted by the state. The doctrine functioned primarily
as a land title doctrine rather than a water rights doctrine.
State Power To Prefer Uses
Traditionally, the public trust doctrine provides that the state has
sovereign control over navigable waters for the protection of specified
public uses, but does not address the question whether some public uses
are preferred over others.2" The protected public uses, navigation, commerce and fisheries, are not always compatible. The use of waters for commerce, for example, may impair other uses, such as navigation and
fisheries. Water diversions that harm instream uses may serve other important public uses, as where the diversions provide a water supply for
a large city. In Colberg, Inc. v. Californiaex rel. Department of Public
Works, 2'8 the California Supreme Court held that the state has broad power
to choose among these potentially competing uses. The court upheld a
legislative enactment authorizing construction of a bridge over navigable
waters, even though the bridge impaired navigation in the waterway. In
effect, the court held that the legislature could prefer "commerce," even
though unconnected with the waterway, over "navigation." In more recent cases, however, the California Supreme Court has viewed the public
trust doctrine primarily as a means to protect certain environmental uses
in water, particularly instream uses. 29 In NationalAudubon Society, for
example, the court held that the state has an "affirmative duty" to protect "public trust uses"-which the court appeared to equate with instream uses-"whenever feasible." 0 Thus, it is unclear whether the public
trust doctrine is neutral concerning public uses or instead prefers instream
uses over other uses.
This question, whether the public trust doctrine prefers some uses over
others, raises significant questions concerning the legislative and judicial
roles in applying and enforcing the public trust doctrine. If the doctrine
is primarily neutral, the legislative branch presumably has complete
authority to determine how the state's water resources are used. If the
legislative branch has this authority, it presumably can delegate its authority to state water law agencies. If, on the other hand, the public trust
doctrine prefers instream uses over other public uses, then the judicial
branch presumably retains some authority to determine whether instream
27. National Audubon Society v. Superior Ct., 33 Cal. 3d 419, 439 n.21, 658 P.2d 722
n.21, 189 Cal. Rptr. 359 n.21; Colberg, Inc. v. California ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works, 67 Cal.
2d 410, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967); Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 273 P. 797
(1928).
28. 67 Cal. 2d 410, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967).
29. E.g., Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259,491 P.2d 374, 379-80,98 Cal. Rptr. 790,
795-96 (1971).
30. NationalAudubonSociety, 33 Cal. 3d at 446, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
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uses are being adequately protected, regardless of whether the legislative
branch has spoken. Thus, the legislative and judicial roles in applying the
doctrine have never been adequately defined. The courts of different states
may define these roles differently.
Nature of State Interest in Water
It is not clear whether the state interest under the public trust doctrine is essentially a proprietary or regulatory interest. That is, does the
state have a paramount property right in water that transcends private
water rights, somewhat in the nature of a public easement? Or, instead,
does the state have a sovereign power to regulate water use, somewhat
akin to the police power? The distinction is often not germane because,
whether the state interest is proprietary or regulatory, the state has the
right to limit private rights in water and thus such private rights are not
truly "vested." The distinction may become germane, however, in determining whether the state, beyond having a right to limit private rights,
also has an affirmative duty to protect public uses in water. If the state
has an affirmative duty to protect public uses, its duty cannot be rationalized under the view that the state interest is purely proprietary.
The California Supreme Court's decisions appear to suggest that the
state interest is both proprietary and regulatory. In Marks v. Whitney,3
the court held that the public possesses an "easement" in navigable
waters, which ensures public access to these waters. Under this view, the
private landowner takes his title subject to a paramount public right to
use navigable waters for public purposes. Similarly, in People v. Gold Run
Ditch & Mining Co.,3 ' the California Supreme Court held that a private
party cannot place a dredging device in navigable waters that impairs
navigation in the waterway. Thus, the private dredger's rights are subject to the public right of navigation. These decisions suggest that the
state power in navigable waters is proprietary in the sense that private
rights are subject to a paramount public right of access or navigation.
In National Audubon Society, on the other hand, the California
Supreme Court held that the public trust doctrine, as applied in the water
rights context, authorizes the state to regulate water uses, as these uses
affect public uses in water. The court said that the state has an "affirmative obligation" to protect public uses in water.33 If, as National
Audubon Society holds, the state has a right and duty to protect public
31. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259, 491 P. 2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971); see also People
v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 584, 138 P. 79, 84 (1913).
32. 66 Cal. 138, 4 P. 1152 (1884). Seealso People v. Russ, 132 Cal. 102, 64 P. 111 (1901)
(holding that diversions in nonnavigable waters that impair public trust uses in navigable
waters are impermissible); Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163
(Mont. 1984); Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1984).
Several recent state decisions have applied public trust protections to waters that are
navigable for recreational purposes but not for historic title purposes. E.g., People ex reL
Younger v. County of El Dorado, 96 Cal. 3d 403 (1979); Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park Dist., 55 Cal. App. 3d 560 (1976); People ex reL Baker v. Mack, 19 Cal. App.
3d 1040 (1971); Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145, 145 N.W. 816 (Wis. 1914).
33. NationalAudubonSociety, 33 Cal. 3d at 446, 658 P.2d at 729, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
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uses, the public trust doctrine does more than simply create a paramount
public property right in water; it also creates regulatory powers and obligations on behalf of the state. Under this view, the state interest is regulatory
as well as proprietary. Indeed, the public trust doctrine, as its name implies, creates a state "trust" responsibility that cannot be measured in
conventional property terms.
Analogy to State Police Power
Although the public trust doctrine may provide a basis for state regulation of water, it does not function similarly to other state regulatory
doctrines, most notably the police power. The police power addresses a
broader range of activity than the public trust doctrine. The police power
limits all private rights and conduct that affect the public health, welfare
and safety,34 and the public trust doctrine limits only private rights in
navigable waters. The public trust doctrine, it seems, is founded on the
premise that the public has unique interests in water. From the ancient
Mesopotamian and Egyptian civilizations to those of the twentieth century, water has provided a means for commerce and has sustained agriculture and industry. Civilizations have flourished where water has flowed.
Although the scope of the public trust doctrine is narrower than that of
the police power, the subject that it addresses, water, is uniquely important in the growth of civilization.
The public trust doctrine is unlike the police power in another respect.
The police power assumes that a private property right exists, and authorizes the state to regulate it for certain public purposes. The public
trust doctrine, on the other hand, defines the nature of the property right
itself. In our federal system, state law defines property rights3 3 including
rights in water.36 The public trust doctrine, by creating a sovereign state
interest in water, limits and thus defines the private right itself. It determines, in conjunction with other property doctrines, the "sticks" that
belong to "the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property."37 This is not to suggest that the state can achieve by definition of
property what it cannot achieve by regulation. As will be explained later,
it is possible that federal constitutional provisions that limit state regulation of property may also apply to state definition of property." Whether
or not such federal constitutional limitations apply, the public trust doctrine must be conceptually understood as a doctrine that defines property rather than regulates its use.
In addition, the public trust doctrine has a self-executing impact that
the police power lacks. A private party, for example, could not seek to
34. E.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
35. Oregon v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 378 (1977); Davies Warehouse
Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 155 (1944).
36. Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 274 U.S. 651 (1927); Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S. 46, 94 (1907); Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S.
324 (1877).
37. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
38. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
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enjoin a water diversion by arguing that the diversion violates the police
power; he must ground his cause of action on some other theory. The police
power becomes relevant only in measuring the validity of actions undertaken by state and local governments that limit private property or activity for public purposes. The public trust doctrine, however, of its own
force, directly limits property uses that impair public uses in water, assuming that the state has not authorized the impairment. In People v. Gold
Run Ditch & Mining Co., 19 for instance, the California Supreme Court held
that a private party could not dredge navigable waters in a way that impairs navigation, unless the dredging was authorized by the state itself.
The prohibition applies whether or not it has been legislatively implemented.
Therefore, the public trust doctrine, of its own force, directly limits
private rights in water-assuming that the state has not authorized such
rights-and does not simply provide a basis for state regulation of such
rights. The doctrine is more in the nature of a substantive sword that can
be wielded by private litigants, not simply a shield available to state and
local governments that act on behalf of public interests. The doctrine
allows the judiciary directly to protect certain public uses in water, assuming that other branches of government have not spoken and selected
among competing public uses.
Analogy to Federal Navigation Power
The public trust doctrine is analogous in many respects to the federal
navigation power. Under the navigation power, which arises under the
commerce clause of the constitution,'0 the federal government has the
power to regulate and control navigation, and to take private property
rights for navigation purposes without payment of compensation. 4' The
public trust doctrine and the federal navigation power are similar in that
both provide for sovereign control of navigable waters and therefore limit
private rights in such waters. The two doctrines are dissimilar in that the
former is a state law doctrine that defines sovereign state interests in
water, and the latter is a federal law doctrine that defines sovereign federal
interests. Under principles of federal supremacy, the former must yield
to the latter in the event of a conflict.
The two doctrines are dissimilar in another, less obvious respect. According to a long line of Supreme Court authority, the federal navigation
power authorizes Congress to legislate for the protection of federal navigation interests, but does not, in itself, prohibit obstructions in navigable
39. 66 Cal. 138, 4 P. 1152 11884).
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
41. United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 231-33 (1960); United States
v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 226 (1956); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co.,
229 U.S. 53 (1913); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899);
Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
1(1824).
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waters or otherwise protect navigation."2 According to this line of authority, no federal common law prohibits obstructions in navigable waters,
and the commerce clause, of its own force, does not prohibit such obstructions either. To fill the void created by this line of authority, Congress
has generously adopted many measures to protect federal interests in
waters, whether directly related to navigation or not. These measures include the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,"' the Clean Water Act,4' the
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act,45 and the Endangered Species Act.4 Absent
these congressional enactments, however, the federal navigation power
does not affect private rights in water. As noted above, however, the public
trust doctrine directly limits the private right. Thus, the federal navigation power, similarly to the state police power, lacks the self-executing
effect of the public trust doctrine.
Summary
To briefly summarize, the public trust doctrine is a unique doctrine
that stands by itself and has no direct precedent in law. It differs from
traditional property doctrines, such as easements, because it has a strong
regulatory component. It differs from traditional regulatory doctrines,
such as the police power and the federal navigation power, because it
directly limits the private property right rather than simply authorizes
the state to regulate it. Indeed, under National Audubon Society, it imposes an affirmative regulatory obligation on the state. The blend of public
and private interests in water seems to be unique in American jurisprudence. The attempt to draw analogies to other legal doctrines seems only
to further obfuscate the public trust doctrine.
In the end, the public trust doctrine is less a monolithic principle of
law than a determination by each state, under its own common law, of
the proper balance between public and private interests in water. The doctrine, as recognized in California, appears to establish both a sovereign
dominium and imperium in water. 7 The dominium protects certain public
uses in water in the absence of affirmative state action. The imperium
allows the state to affirmatively regulate private rights in water for public
42. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1 (1888); Hamilton v. Vicksburg,
S. & P. R.R., 119 U.S. 280 (1886); Cardwell v. American Bridge Co., 113 U.S. 205, 208-09
(1885); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724 (1868).
43. Act of March 3, 1899, ch. 425 (1899), § 9, 30 Stat. 1151 as amended Pub. L. No.
97-322. Title I, §107(b), 96 Stat. 1582 (1982) and Pub. L. No. 97-449, § 2(f), 96 Stat. 2440
(1982) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467e (1982)).
44. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) as amended Pub. L. No. 95-217, §§ 5(a),
26(b), 91 Stat. 567 (1977) and Pub. L. No. 100-4, Title III, § 316(b), 101 Stat. 60 (1987) (codified
as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)).
45. Pub. L. No. 90-542, § l(b), 82 Stat. 906 (1968) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287
(1982)).
46. Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 2, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) as amended Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 1,
93 Stat. 1225 (1979) and Pub. L. No. 97-304, 89(a), 96 Stat. 1426 (1982) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1543 (1982)).
47. As the late Professor Frank Trelease noted, state and federal "ownership" interests
in water are different than private interests. Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship
of Water, 45 CAL. L. REv. 638, 649-50 (1957).
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purposes. In fact, under NationalAudubon Society, the state has an affirmative obligation to do so. It is unclear, however, whether the state
has complete authority to choose among competing public uses in water,
or instead must prefer instream uses over other uses. In any event, the
combination of the state dominium and imperium in water limits private
property rights, and precludes such rights from being truly "vested" in
a conventional sense except as against other property owners. As will be
explained, the public trust doctrine, so viewed, is not as alien in the water
rights context as has often been believed.
CONGRUENCY OF PUBLIC TRUST PRINCIPLES AND WATER LAW PRINCIPLES

Historically, the right to use water has been governed by familiar principles of water law, notably the riparian doctrine and the appropriation
doctrine. The riparian doctrine, which originated in the English common
law, recognized that a landowner, as an incident of his land ownership,
had the right to use water contiguous to his land.48 The appropriation doctrine, which originated as a custom among the early gold miners of the
American West, held that a person had the right to divert water to "beneficial use" whether or not he was a landowner.' 9 The appropriation doctrine and, to a lesser degree, the riparian doctrine have been codified in
the water rights laws of most Western states. To a large extent, the doctrines are now governed by a common standard of use. In California, for
example, the people adopted a constitutional amendment in 1928 providing
that all water rights, whether riparian or appropriative, exist only to the
extent that water is put to "reasonable and beneficial use."5 " The reasonable use standard is now the basic water law of California, and applies
equally to riparian and appropriative rights."1 California has adopted a
permit system to administer the reasonable use standard in the appropriation context. To obtain a permit, an appropriator must satisfy California's water rights agency that his proposed use is "reasonable and
beneficial" and in the "public interest. 5 Thus, water rights in California
and elsewhere were generally thought to be governed by the reasonable
use standard, not the public trust doctrine.
Although the public trust doctrine, in name, was not considered an
aspect of water law, the doctrine in its underlying theory has been an his48. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 390-91, 10 P. 674, 759-60 (1886); Herminghaus v.
Southern Cal. Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81, 95, 252 P. 607, 613(1926); 1 S. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS
IN THE WESTERN STATES § 709, at 733-75 (1911); W. HUTCHINS, CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER
RIGHTS 40-41 (1956).
49. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 742-49 (1950); Jennison v.
Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 458-59 (1878); Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist.,
26 Cal. 3d 183, 195, 605 P.2d 1, 7, 161 Cal. Rptr. 466, 472 (1980); S. WIEL, supra note 48,
at §§ 377-381, at 406-12.
50. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 22 P.2d 5 (1933).
51. Joslin v. Matin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 138, 429 P.2d 889, 893, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 377, 381 (1967); Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 367, 40 P.2d 486, 498-99 (1935).
52. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 100, 1253, 1255, 1257 (West 1971); Environmental Defense
Fund v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 26 Cal. 3d 183, 195, 605 P.2d 1, 7, 161 Cal. Rptr. 406,
472 (1980).
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5
toric feature of water law. In Kansas v. Colorado," the Supreme Court
held that the states' authority to adopt water rights laws within our federal
system derives from equal footing principles, which provide that the states
acquire sovereign power over navigable waters as an inherent attribute
of their sovereignty." The states' water rights authority, the Court reawhether the riparian or appropriasoned, includes the right to determine
55
same token, the Supreme Court
the
By
state.
each
tion doctrine applies in
public trust authority also
states'
the
that
explained
Central
Illinois
in
derives from equal footing principles.5 Thus, the states' water rights
authority and public trust authority derive from the same federal constitutional source. In other words, the equal footing doctrine is the ultimate source of state power over navigable waters, and this doctrine provides the foundation of the states' water rights authority and public trust
authority. The common constitutional link suggests that the state's public
trust authority may be relevant in measuring its water rights authority.
Since the states acquired a sovereign interest in water under equal
footing principles, the states' interest in water has always been regarded
as different than their interest in land. By the same token, the private
landowner's interests in land and water have never been considered the
same. Although the landowner could acquire an absolute fee interest in
land, he was never thought to have a fee interest in water. Instead, the
private water right has always been regarded as usufructuary rather than
possessory. The landowner does not5 7own the corpus of the water, but instead has a limited right to its use. This does not mean that the state
cannot create private property rights in water, or that such rights may
not be subject to federal constitutional protections. The nature of such
rights, however, and the scope of any federal constitutional protections,
must be read against the backdrop of the states' sovereign interests in
water that arise under equal footing principles.

645, 654-55
53. 206 U.S. 46, 94 (1907); see also California v. United States, 438 U.S.
(1899).
(1978); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Dist., 174 U.S. 690, 704-06
54. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
v. Beaver
55. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 94. Later, in California Or. Power Co.
Desert Land
Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935), the Supreme Court held that the region, and
Act of 1877 "severed" the water from the public domain lands in the Western
acquire their
therefore that federal patentees acquiring land grants under federal law must v. Colorado,
water rights under state and local laws. Citing its earlier decision in Kansas
the Court stated that "since 'Congress cannot enforce either [the riparian or appropriation]
Desert
rule upon any state,' ... the full power of choice must remain with the state. The
recognizes
Land Act does not bind or purport to bind the states to any policy. It simply the state
to
and gives sanction, in so far as the United States and its grantees are concerned,
be an imand local doctrine of appropriation, and seeks to remove what otherwise might authority
pediment to its full and successful operation." 295 U.S. at 164. Therefore, the states' as defined
to adopt the riparian or appropriation doctrine derives from equal footing principles, Califorin
in Kansas u. Colorado, and is reaffirmed by the severance principles articulated
nia Oregon Power.
sovereign
56. 146 U.S. 387, 456-58 (1882). In support of the view that the state has
in its
interests in navigable waters, the Court cited the equal footing principles describedHagan,
v.
Lessee
Pollard's
(1876);
391
U.S.
94
Virginia,
v.
McCready
in
decisions
earlier
44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1848); and Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842). P. 577
57. Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252 (1853); Gould v. Eaton, 117 Cal. 539, 49
RIGHTS
(1897); 1 S. WIEL, supra note 48, at 13-21; 1 C. KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER
769-73 (2d ed. 1912).
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The Western states, in particular, have adopted constitutional and
statutory provisions reaffirming their sovereign interests in water, thus
indicating an intent not to relinquish the sovereign interests that derive
from equal footing principles. Some states provide by constitutional or
statutory enactments that water is the "property" of the people." Others
provide that water use is a "public use" subject to state regulation and
control. 9 The former presupposes that the state has a paramount proprietary right in water, and the latter that the state has a paramount
regulatory interest. In either case, these constitutional and statutory provisions reaffirm that the states have sovereign interests in water that are
dissimilar from their interests in land. Although these provisions define
the nature of state power in different ways, and fail to define the outer
limits of state power, they make clear that state power exists in some form.
The states' sovereign interest in water in particular has been considered an inherent limitation of an appropriativeright. Since its inception, the appropriation doctrine has been viewed as a recognition of "public
ownership" of water.60 The theory of the appropriation doctrine is that
an appropriator, unlike a riparian, does not own land and therefore cannot "own" water.6 1 Therefore, any usufructuary right the appropriator
enjoys is granted by the sovereign, which retains the power to determine
whether water is being put to "beneficial use." Although the limits of the
state's power to determine "beneficial use" have never been determined,
it is clear that this power enables the state, to some degree, to determine
the social value of the use. Therefore, the "beneficial use" rule itself, which
underlies the appropriative right, presupposes some measure of state
regulatory control of the appropriative right.
Many states have assumed regulatory control over riparian rights,
which were once thought to be "natural" property rights that were beyond
state control. Some states, following Colorado's example, rejected the
riparian doctrine altogether; a water user can acquire only an appropriative
right and has no "property" rights in water. 61 Other states, following California's example, retained the riparian doctrine but also adopted the appropriation doctrine; under this view, a landowner does have a "property"
right in water.6 3 Even in California, however, the people adopted a con58. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1971); CoLo. CONST. art. XVI, § 5; IDAHO
§ 42-101 (1977); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7467 (Vernon 1954); WYo. CONST. art.

CODE

VIII, § 1.

59. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. X, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 5; WASH. CONST. art,
XXI, § 1; see Allen v. Petrick, 29 Mont. 373, 377, 22 P. 451, 452 (1924).
60. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95 (1907).
61. 1 S. WIEL, supra note 48, § 170, at 193-95; 1 C. KINNEY, supra note 57, §§ 450-453,
585, at 759-68, 1005.
62. S. WIEL, supra note 48, §§ 151-157, at 173-85; C. KINNEY, supra note 57, §§ 628-631,
at 1099-105; Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CALIF. L. REV.
638, 650 (1967); Note, Federal-StateConflicts Over the Control of Western Waters, 60 COLuM. L. REV. 967, 972-73 (1960).
63. 1 S. WIEL, supra note 48, §§ 167-187, at 185-228; C. KINNEY, supra note 57, §§
632-635, at 1105-11.
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stitutional amendment subjecting riparian rights to the same reasonable
use standard that governs appropriative rights.54 Thus, although California has not adopted a permit system for riparian rights comparable to
that applicable to appropriative rights, California nonetheless subjects
the riparian right to the same substantive standards that apply to the
appropriative right. California's authority to apply the reasonable use
standard to riparian rights presupposes that the state has sovereign
regulatory control over such rights.
In summary, the states have unique sovereign interests in water that
they do not have in land. The state interest, arising under equal footing
principles, which is a federal law doctrine. The federal principle of equality is reaffirmed by state constitutional and statutory provisions asserting sovereign state interests in water. The state's sovereign interest in
water is inherent in the nature of the appropriative right. It has also been
applied to the riparian right. Thus, the public trust doctrine, which provides that the state has sovereign interest in water, is an historic feature
of the water laws, although the doctrine has never been explicitly applied
in this context.
In Palmer v. Railroad Commission," decided in 1914, the California
Supreme Court held that the state does not have "ownership" of water
and therefore does not have regulatory authority over water rights. The
court noted, correctly, that water rights are usufructuary rather than
possessory." The court also stated, correctly, that the water user's usufructuary right is a property interest, in that he has a reasonable expectation of continued use.6 The court concluded wrongly, however, that
because the water user has a property right in water, the state has no
"property" right and therefore cannot regulate the private right. 68 The
fact that a water user has a "property" right in water does not support
the conclusion that the state cannot regulate the right. The state, for example, clearly can regulate property under the police power for the protection of certain public purposes. Indeed, California's constitutional
amendment subjecting riparian rights to the reasonable use standard
presupposes that the state has the right to regulate water rights.
Therefore, although a water user may have a "property" interest in water,
and although his interest may be subject to federal constitutional protections, the state has the right to define and regulate his property
right to the extent that state law allows and that federal law does not
prohibit.
64. See supra note 50 and accompanying text; see also In re Waters of Long Valley
Creek Stream System, 25 Cal. 3d 339, 605 P.2d 859, 162 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1979) (holding that
State Water Resources Control Board, in a statutory water rights adjudication proceeding,
can quantify and prioritize riparian rights that have not been exercised).
65. 167 Cal. 163, 138 P. 997 (1914).
66. 167 Cal. at 167-68, 138 P. at 999.
67. Id
68. Id-
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Decision

In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court,"9 the California
Supreme Court considered for the first time whether the public trust doctrine, by name, applies in the water rights context. The City of Los Angeles
had built an aqueduct that diverts water from Mono Lake tributaries to
the city, where the water is used for domestic purposes. The city acquired
water rights permits, and later licenses, under California's appropriation
procedures. At the time that the permits were issued, California's permitissuing agency lacked specific statutory authority to consider environmental values, and in fact did not consider such values in issuing the permits.
The diversions provide Los Angeles with about seventeen percent of its
water supply, but they also reduce the size of Mono Lake and cause environmental damage in and around the lake. The National Audubon Society brought an action to enjoin the city's diversions, arguing that the diversions violated public trust values-equated with environmental values-in
and around the lake and hence were invalid per se. The city argued that
the public trust doctrine cannot be invoked to challenge a water right
granted under state law, and in any event that the city's water rights were
"vested" and hence not subject to continuing state review.
The California Supreme Court adopted a middle ground. The court
held that the doctrine could be used to directly challenge a water right
granted under state law. The court, however, rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the diversions are unlawful per se because they violate public
trust values. Instead, the court adopted a balancing test to determine the
effect of the public trust doctrine in the water rights context. Under the
balancing test, the city's domestic needs for water must be weighed
against Mono Lake's environmental needs, and can be limited only if the
balance tips in favor of the lake's needs. 0 Since the court held that the
state can reconsider the city's water rights, albeit under the balancing
test rather than the per se rule, the court rejected the city's argument
that its water rights were "vested" and hence not subject to review.
National Audubon Society, in holding that the state can reconsider
past water allocation decisions, properly recognizes that historic water
uses may not always be consistent with modern public needs. As noted
earlier, water is a unique resource vital to commerce, navigation, agriculture and the environment. In the arid West, once depicted by cartographers as the "Great American Desert," water is an especially important
resource. It has been said that water is the West's "life blood." 71 In little
more than a century, the West's economy has been transformed. Its economic base has shifted from mining to agriculture and, more recently, to
industry. Cities have replaced deserts, creating water needs for people who
inhabit them. In counter point, environmental values have gained new
public awareness, and many of these values depend on water. As the
West's economy and demography change, and as its environmental heri69. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983).
70. 33 Cal. at 446, 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
71. Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 217 Cal. 673, 702, 22 P.2d 5, 16 (1933).
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tage gains fresh appreciation, the public needs in water change, and water
resources should be accommodated to these changing needs. If the state
can regulate property under its police power, a fortiori, it can regulate
the resource that most affects its economic, demographic and environmental interests. The state's interest in regulating this resource is particularly compelling where, as in NationalAudubon Society, the water right was
granted without consideration of its effect on environmental values.
NationalAudubon Society, to a significant degree, limits the intrusion of newly-expressed public trust principles upon California's longestablished water law system. In earlier public trust cases, the court held
that the public trust doctrine encumbers all private rights in lands underlying navigable water.72 In National Audubon Society, however, the court
held that the public trust doctrine functions differently in the water rights
context than in other contexts. As applied in the water rights context,
the public trust doctrine requires that the state balance competing economic needs and environmental values, and provides that the state may
revoke or modify prior water rights only if such rights are outweighed
by public needs in water. By adopting the balancing test, the court recognized that the plaintiffs' per se argument would potentially disrupt
California's water supply system and invalidate many rights that have
been long exercised in good faith and for important public purposes. In
California, many public water agencies, serving important municipal and
agricultural needs, depend on diversions that may have some impact on
instream values in the source stream. The court properly recognized that
it is too late in the day to turn California's economic clock backward, as
the clock is driven by water diversions.
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that, if the state can
authorize impairment of instream values, the impairment can be authorized only by the legislature, not by the state water rights agency. According to the court, the water rights agency itself can balance competing
economic needs and environmental values, and can authorize water diversions if, in the agency's judgment, the economic needs outweigh environmental values. 73 In Massachusetts, the courts have adopted the view that
the legislature alone has the power to authorize impairment of instream
values.7" If the Massachusetts rule prevailed in California, the state water
rights agency would have difficulty in carrying out its legislativelymandated duties under the water laws. These water laws authorize the
agency to grant appropriative water rights if, in the agency's judgment,
uses satisfy the reasonable use test and are in the
the proposed water
"public interest. '" 71 The court in National Audubon Society properly rejected the Massachusetts rule.
72. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
73. National Audubon Society, 33 Cal. 3d at 446, 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at

364 ("The Legislature, acting directly or through an authorized agency such as the Water
Board," may authorize water diversions that "may unavoidably harm the trust uses at the
source stream.")
74. Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
75. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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Nonetheless, NationalAudubon Society suffers from certain doctrinal
infirmities and, similarly to Illinois Centra, leaves some unanswered questions. The decision appeared to view the public trust doctrine as standing
apart from, and as in conflict with, the water law. Indeed, in the court's
mind, the two doctrines were on a "collision course."76 In reconciling the
doctrines, the court held that the "public trust doctrine" provides a
separate remedy to challenge a water right granted under the water laws,
and specifically declined to consider whether the plaintiffs might have had
a remedy under the water laws themselves." To be sure, the court avoided the "collision course" by interpreting the public trust doctrine as requiring a balancing of competing interests and values, which is not dissimilar from the approach required under the reasonable use test established in water law.
Even so, National Audubon Society, by viewing the doctrines as on
a "collision course," overlooked the natural congruency of the doctrines.
As noted earlier, public trust principles have always been part of the water
laws, in that the water laws provide that the state has continuing sovereign control over water rights. In fact, both public trust principles and
state water laws ultimately derive from the federal constitutional source
of the equal footing doctrine. In light of the historic relationship between
the public trust doctrine and state water laws, it is difficult to see how
these two doctrines are on a "collision course." A collision would occur
only if the public trust doctrine requires the state to make choices among
competing public uses that are different than the choices required under
the water laws. The court in NationalAudubon Society, however, citing
its earlier decision in Colberg,Inc. v. Californiaex rel. DepartmentofPublic
Works,"8 reaffirmed that the state has the right to make these choices
under the public trust doctrine,79 and did not suggest that these choices
are any different than the choices mandated by the water laws. Further,
the court, by failing to consider whether the plaintiffs had a remedy under
the water laws, failed to define what choices are required under the water
laws. The court's understanding of the relationship between public trust
principles and the water laws was thus unclear. The court seemed to emphasize the differences rather than similarities between these doctrines,
and overlooked their natural congruency.
The National Audubon Society analysis invites the possibility of a
conflict between public trust principles and water law principles. If the
public trust doctrine provides a separate remedy, it is presumably governed by a different standard than the reasonable use standard that constitutionally applies to all water rights in California. If the standards are
different, then water rights may be subject to potentially conflicting standards. The court in NationalAudubon Society resolved the potential con76. 33 Cal. 3d at 425, 658 P.2d at 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 349 (1983).
77. 33 Cal. 3d at 447 n.28, 658 P.2d at 728 n.28, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365 n.28.
78. 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967).
79. NationalAudubonSociety, 33 Cal. 3d at 439 n.21, 440, 658 P.2d at 722 n.21, 723,
189 Cal. Rptr. at 359 n.21, 360 ("[Tjhe public trust doctrine does not prevent the state from
choosing between trust uses....").
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flict by stating that "[aill uses of water, including public trust uses, must
80
now conform to the standard of reasonable use." This brief but significant passage suggests that, in the court's mind, the ultimate criteria for
measuring a water right must be found in the reasonable use test-which
derives from consititutional principles-rather than the public trust doctrine, which is based on common law. Thus, the court appeared to suggest that the public trust doctrine requires consideration of instream
values, but that the constitutional test authorizes the state to balance
these values against other public needs. This formulation, it is submitted, properly reconciles the public trust doctrine and the water laws, to
the extent that reconciliation is needed. This formulation, however, appears inconsistent with other parts of the NationalAudubon Society decision that focus solely on public trust values in measuring Los Angeles'
water right. In the end, the decision at times articulates a sound rationale
for reconciling these historic doctrines, and other times articulates a less
tenable rationale.8'
The courts of other states have avoided the doctrinal infirmities of
NationalAudubon Society in explaining the relationship between the doc-2
Commission,
trines. In United Plainsmanv. North Dakota State Water
the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the state has an obligation
to provide for long-range planning of water resources. The court stated
that this result was supported both by North Dakota's water law and by
83
the public trust doctrine. In Shokal v. Dunn, the Idaho Supreme Court
interpreted Idaho's "public interest" statute as authorizing the state's
water rights agency to grant appropriative permits subject to the agency's continuing authority to determine at a future time whether the water
should be allocated for other purposes. These decisions appear to use public
trust principles to support and explain the state's water law, and thus
weave public trust principles and water law principles into a tighter fabric
than in National Audubon Society.
80. 33 Cal. 3d at 443, 658 P.2d at 725, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 362. In a brief but illuminating
the court acknowledged that California water laws codify "in part" the state's
footnote,
"obligation" to protect public trust uses. 33 Cal. at 446 n.27, 658 P.2d at 728 n.27, 189 Cal.
Rptr. at 364 n.27. The water laws do not render the public trust doctrine "superfluous,"
the court stated, because it precludes legislative repeal of the public trust protections, "confirmisi the state's sovereign supervision," and requires consideration of public trust uses
in cases filed directly in the courts rather than before the water rights agency. Id.
81. In two decisions rendered subsequently to NationalAudubon Society, the California Courts of Appeal have held that the water laws, either by themselves or by incorporating
public trust principles, authorize the state to exercise continuing regulatory jurisdiction over
water rights. See United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d
82, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1986); Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water
Resources Control Bd., 186 Cal. App. 3d 1160, 231 Cal. Rptr. 283 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1986).
These decisions seem to more accurately reflect the congruency between the water laws and
public trust principles.
82. 247 N.W.2d 457, 462-63 (N.D. 1976).
83. 707 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1985); see also Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v.
Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1984); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran,
682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc.,
671 P.2d 1085, 1087-89 (Idaho 1983).
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LIMITs OF STATE POWER

Perhaps the greatest difficulty in applying public trust principles in
the water rights context is in determining the proper limits of state power
to change existing water rights. It is easy enough to suggest that the state
should have the right to reconsider water uses that no longer serve public
needs. It is much more difficult to determine how far the state can go in
reconsidering existing water uses. Once the state steps onto the public
trust slope, the slope may become very slippery indeed.
In NationalAudubon Society, the California Supreme Court adopted
a balancing test that, in effect, limits state power to revoke prior water
rights. Under the balancing test, the state may modify private rights only
if public needs outweigh private rights. The balancing test, however, does
not tell lower courts or agencies how to balance these needs. It is difficult
for a state court judge to "balance" fish against a city's water needs,
especially where the judge has no experience in making such judgments.
The balance of competing needs ultimately involves policy judgments
rather than legal ones, and is more properly within the legislative rather
than the judicial sphere. State legislative bodies should therefore adopt
procedural mechanisms and substantive standards governing conflicts between competing water needs to the extent that they have not done so.
In the absence of legislative guidance, the courts should adopt their own
rules governing such conflicts. Some proposed rules will now be discussed,
as well as some factors relevant to such conflicts.
Presumptions
One possible way to limit excessive state regulation of private rights
would be to adopt a presumption that a water right, once granted and
exercised, is valid in the absence of a preponderance of evidence to the
contrary. Under this approach, the burden of proof would rest on those
who challenge existing water rights on public trust grounds. Some have
argued, however, that public trust values should be presumptively valid
in the absence of persuasive evidence to the contrary, and thus that the
burden should rest on the water user to establish the validity of his right.
The difficulty with the latter approach is that it presumes that the state
water rights process is invalid to the extent that the state has granted
water rights that affect instream uses. The latter approach is untenable
if a state water rights agency has already balanced public and private
needs in granting the water right.
Ultimately, any presumptions relating to the balancing of competing
needs should be developed by the legislative rather than judicial branch,
because the legislative branch is the proper branch to balance economic
needs and environmental values. It is possible that a statutory presumption will not greatly assist a water rights agency in trying to develop a
practical, workable regime that accommodates all competing interests in
an actual dispute, but such a presumption might provide a helpful starting point.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol22/iss2/27
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Administrative Role
One way to promote uniformity of public trust decisions would be to
require that such decisions should be made in the first instance by the
state agency that administers the water rights system. This result might
be accomplished by legislation providing that a party challenging a water
right must initiate his claim before the water rights agency. State water
rights agencies generally have considerable expertise in balancing economic needs and environmental values. They are often called on to make
such balances in considering water rights applications. California's water
rights agency, for example, recently examined conflicting consumptive
and instream needs in determining whether the U. S. Bureau of Reclamation has the right to divert water from the environmentally-sensitive San4
Francisco-San Joaquin Delta to agricultural users in central California.
Thus, state water agencies often have a statewide perspective and expertise that courts may lack. Greater uniformity in the decision-making process could be achieved if state water agencies initially balance public and
private needs in water.
The Taking Clause
The state's power to limit private water rights may be constrained
by the taking clause of the constitution, which prohibits the "taking" of
property without payment of compensation. The taking clause is contained
in the fifth amendment, and is made applicable to states under the fourteenth amendment. 5 The taking clause applies not only where the state
condemns property, but also where the state excessively regulates pro86
perty use under the police power. On the other hand, a state may exeruse for public purposes, and no
property
regulate
to
power
police
cise its
87
unconstitutional "taking" occurs under such circumstances. In Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York City,"" the Supreme Court adopted
a balancing test to distinguish between reasonable regulation and unconstitutional taking of property. The balancing test focuses on (1) the
"economic impact of the regulation" on the property use, (2) the extent
to which the regulation interferes with "distinct investment-backed expectations" of the property owner, and (3) the "character of the government action. "89
If the taking clause applies to state water rights regulation, the
Supreme Court would have authority to review the constitutional valid84. See United States v. State Water Resources Control Board, 182 Cal. App. 3d 82,
227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1986); see also California v. Kleppe, 604 F.2d 1187,
1191 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding conditions imposed by the State Water Resources Control
Board in water appropriation permits issued to the U. S. Bureau of Reclamation relating
to the New Melones Dam in California).
85. U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV; see Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226 (1897).
86. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979); Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
87. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Walls v. Midland Carbon
Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920).
88. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
89. 438 U.S. at 124.
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ity of state decisions affecting private water rights. Under this authority, the Supreme Court presumably would apply the Penn Centralbalancing test to determine whether an unconstitutional taking has occurred,
after the state has applied the National Audubon Society balancing test
to determine whether the rights can be limited under state law.
It is not clear, however, whether the taking clause applies to state
regulation of water rights. On the one hand, the clause applies when the
state excessively restrains the use of "property." As noted earlier, a water
right is a form of "property." ' 90 The right is usufructuary rather than
possessory, in that the water user has the right to use water but does
not "own" it. Even so, the water user's right to use water is a property
interest because he has a reasonable expectation of continued use, subject to any sovereign state constraints that might apply. To the extent
that his use consists of a property interest, it is within the ambit of the
taking clause.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has consistently held that state
law defines "property" in our federal system. It can be argued that,
although a water user has a protected interest in water, the nature of his
property right depends on state law; because the state has a superior interest in the water, the water user does not have a reasonable expectation of continued use within the purview of the taking clause. Under this
view, when a state limits a water right, it is defining property rather than
regulating it. It is not clear whether the Supreme Court would apply the
Penn Central balancing test where the state re-defines property rather
than regulates it. The Supreme Court has held in one line of cases, however,
that the state cannot circumvent the taking clause by re-defining property rather than explicitly regulating it. State definitions of property rights,
the Court has held, must rest on a "fair and substantial basis" so that
there is "no evasion of constitutional principles."9
In another line of cases, the Supreme Court has held that state claims
of "ownership" of natural resources, including water, cannot be used to
circumvent the commerce clause. In Hughes v. Oklahoma, 93 the Court held
that Oklahoma does not "own" its wildlife in a conventional sense, but
instead has the right to regulate wildlife under its police power. The Court
concluded that Oklahoma law, in restricting shipment of wildlife in interstate commerce, was subject to the constraints of the commerce clause,
which prohibits states from imposing unreasonable burdens on interstate commerce. Similarly, in Sporhase v. Nebraska,9" the Court held that
90. E.g., Palmer v. Railroad Comm'n, 167 Cal. 163, 167-68, 138 P. 997, 999 (19141.
91. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
92. Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36 (1944); Broad River Power
Co. v. South Carolina, 281 U.S. 537 (1930); Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 274
U.S. 651, 656-57 (1927).

93. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).

94. 458 U.S. 941 (1982). For a related article on this case in this issue see Trelease, Interstate Use of Water-"Sporhase v. El Paso, Pike & Vermejo," XXII LAND & WATER L.
REV. 315 (1987).
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Nebraska does not "own" its groundwater, and thus that Nebraska's
groundwater regulations are subject to challenge under the commerce
clause. In effect, the Court in Hughes and Sporhase held that state claims
to "ownership" of natural resources, including water, cannot circumvent
federal constitutional guarantees relating to interstate commerce. It is
a small step to hold that state "ownership" claims in water cannot circumvent federal constitutional guarantees relating to private property.
The Court, however, might possibly distinguish between interstate commerce and private property in considering the nature of state "ownership"
of water. To date, the Court has not spoken.

CONCLUSION

The public trust doctrine, by whatever name, reflects an attempt by
the courts to accommodate water resources with changing public needs.
The West's water needs have greatly changed since the early miners
diverted water to their mining claims, and since the early farmers diverted
water to irrigate their crops. Since those early days, the West's economy
has been transformed, its demography has changed, and its environmental heritage has assumed new importance. These developments, it is submitted, require a continuing accommodation of public and private interests
in water. An infusion of public trust principles into water law seems inevitable, and indeed a fusion of sorts has always existed. Since a state's
right to regulate private property in other contexts is beyond cavil, its
right to regulate the resource, water, that most affects the public weal
can hardly be gainsaid.
The most formidable obstacles in accommodating public trust and
water law principles lie ahead. First, there is a need to provide a more
tenable rationale than that appearing in NationalAudubon Society, which
sometimes confuses and often overlooks the inherent compatibility of
these principles. The greater difficulty, however, lies in actually balancing public and private needs in water in an actual controversy, and in
developing guidelines that will enable courts and administrative agencies
to make these balances. Such guidelines are necessary to provide for some
measure of security and predictability to the holders of private water
rights, as well as some uniformity in the decision-making process. The
very nature of sovereign state interests in water precludes absolute certainty. Some guidance, however, is necessary to allow municipal and agricultural water agencies to have a reasonably predictable water supply and
plan for future needs.
Ironically, the defenders of the public trust doctrine often argue that
the doctrine will have a minimal impact on water rights. In their view,
"the sky is not falling." Conversely, its opponents often argue that the
effects will be sweeping and devastating. The unspoken consensus seems
to be that the greater the dislocation of existing rights, the less tenable
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the doctrine. Courts and agencies must apply the doctrine in a way that
protects important public needs in water without causing undue dislocation of existing rights. This is the only way that the public trust doctrine,
by whatever name, will become an accepted principle of American jurisprudence and live up to its promise.
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